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I THINK WE SHOULD SEE OTHER PEOPLE:
THE BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING HANDSET
EXCLUSIVITY AND INSTITUTING TIERED
PRICING IN THE MOBILE BROADBAND
MARKET
INTRODUCTION
In 1973, the first portable handset cell phone was introduced at a press
conference in New York City.1 Since that time, cell phones have evolved
almost unimaginably. First, there was the flip phone, then slim phones, and
then features such as email and mobile broadband access were introduced.2
Between 2005 and 2008, the number of mobile wireless data plan
subscribers exploded from zero to over 14.5 million.3 The continued
evolution of cell phones has led to handset exclusivity.4 Handset exclusivity
results when a contract between a handset manufacturer and a wireless
carrier explicitly requires that a new handset is exclusively compatible with
a specific carrier.5 This type of agreement is most famously illustrated by
the iPhone, which, until February 2011,6 had been compatible only with
AT&T’s wireless network.7
The two main governing bodies overseeing the mobile broadband
market are the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FCC regulates mobile broadband
relating to handset exclusivity and net neutrality through two key regulatory
decisions made by the FCC. The first is the Cellular CPE Bundling Order,
issued in 1992, in which the FCC repealed an earlier decision requiring
wireless carriers, like traditional landline carriers, to sell their services
unbundled from the hardware used to connect to the network.8 As a result,
wireless carriers who were originally prevented from selling handsets

1. Robert Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Why the iPhone Won’t Last Forever and What the
Government Should Do to Promote its Successor, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 313, 317
(2010).
2. Id. at 317–23.
3. Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 748 (2010).
4. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 1, at 317.
5. Handset Exclusivity, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/handset
-exclusivity (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
6. Press Release, Apple Inc., Verizon Wireless & Apple Team Up to Deliver iPhone 4 on
Verizon (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/01/11Verizon-Wireless-Apple
-Team-Up-to-Deliver-iPhone-4-on-Verizon.html.
7. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 1, at 324.
8. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420,
423 (1968) [hereinafter Use of the Carterfone Device]; Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises
Equip. & Cellular Serv., 7 FCC Rcd. 4028 (1992) (report & order) [hereinafter CPE Bundling
Order].
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exclusively tied to their networks were given the freedom to do so.9 The
second is the decision by the FCC to classify mobile broadband as an
information service.10 This decision, in light of recent events, has limited
the FCC’s ability to regulate mobile broadband.11 Yet, when one door
closes, another opens. Due to the FCC’s decision to classify mobile
broadband as an information service, the FTC, which does not have
regulatory power over common carriers, but possesses the power to regulate
information services, gained the ability to exert regulatory control over
mobile broadband.12
Agreements between wireless providers and handset manufacturers
resulting in handset exclusivity have a significant impact on net neutrality.
Simply defined, net neutrality is the concept that internet users should have
unrestricted access to legal content, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
should not be able to impede the dissemination of such information.13 The
idea of maintaining an open and unrestricted internet is based on the
philosophy that the information traveling through a network should remain
completely independent from the provider of the network and not influence
the flow of information on an ISP’s network.14
Proponents of net neutrality fear that if left unrestricted, ISPs would be
free to block or slow the delivery of content for reasons such as corporate
partnerships or direct competition with the provider itself.15 This fear is not
unfounded. In the past, the FCC has had to take action in cases where
broadband providers were blocking content from passing through their
networks.16 In 2005, Madison River Communications paid $15,000 and
agreed to abstain from blocking subscribers’ use of the internet telephone
service Vonage.17 Professor Edward Felton explains that the internet has
been successful because of “its openness to new services. Google and

9. See generally CPE Bundling Order, supra note 8 (“Despite our concerns about the status
of competition in the cellular service market, the records supports [sic] the conclusion that
clarifying the current bundling policy to allow facilities-based carriers to bundle cellular CPE and
service would not have an adverse impact on the cellular CPE market.”).
10. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless
Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007) (declaratory ruling) [hereinafter Appropriate Regulatory
Treatment].
11. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
12. See FTC, STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 38 (June
2007) [hereinafter BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY].
13. Claire Cain Miller & Brian Stelter, Web Plan is Dividing Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 2010, at B.1.
14. Internet Freedom and Innovation at Risk: Why Congress Must Restore Strong Net
Neutrality Protection, ACLU (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/internet-freedom
-and-innovation-risk-why-congress-must-restore-strong-net-neutrality-pro [hereinafter Internet
Freedom and Innovation at Risk].
15. See id.
16. See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644; Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297
(2005) (consent decree).
17. Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. at 4297.
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Facebook were started by students; eBay was started by a guy in his
apartment. These innovators didn’t need to beg or buy permission from
anyone. . . . [T]heir traffic got the same treatment as everyone else’s.”18 If
the “open” internet was to be transformed into one governed, not by users,
but by service providers, net neutrality proponents argue that the incentive
to innovate that existed at the infancy of some of the most popular and
influential websites today would be extinguished.19 Without the guarantee
that their inventions would be compatible with all internet connections, the
creators of Facebook, Google, and eBay may have seen the time
commitment and financial risk involved in developing their new technology
stacked too heavily against them.20 Albert Wenger, a partner at Union
Square Ventures, points out that “it is easy to lose sight of the most basic
principle that net neutrality is trying to achieve: the ability for innovative
start-ups to deliver their content and services on a level playing field with
incumbents.”21 In addition to concern about how content flows through
broadband networks, net neutrality proponents are equally concerned with
how a customer is able to access the content. The ability for a consumer to
attach any device to any network is a basic tenet of net neutrality.22
New policies, such as tiered pricing for wireless broadband access,
although viewed negatively by some net neutrality proponents, provide
incentives for wireless broadband providers to expand network
capabilities.23 Additionally, these pricing schemes would alleviate overstressed networks24 and offer greater customer clarity regarding the services
received, coupled with valuable pricing options. Handset exclusivity,
however, greatly reduces customer freedom since customers are locked in
to a specific provider. This lockup causes concern over content
discrimination due to vertical and horizontal integration and the financial
impracticability of switching carriers and purchasing a compatible handset.
This note will discuss both handset exclusivity and tiered pricing as
they apply to net neutrality. The elimination of handset exclusivity, coupled
with the implementation of tiered pricing for mobile broadband data, strikes
18. Edward W. Felton, ‘Neutrality’ Is Hard to Define, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/8/9/who-gets-priority-on-the-web/net-neutrality-is
-hard-to-define.
19. Neutrality Encourages Innovation, OPPOSING VIEWS, http://www.opposingviews.com
/arguments/neutrality-encourages-innovation (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
20. Id.
21. Nick Bilton, More on the Net Neutrality Debate, BITS N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2010, 1:19
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/inside-the-net-neutrality-debate/ (quoting Albert
Wegner) (omission in original).
22. Internet Freedom and Innovation at Risk, supra note 14.
23. Editorial, The Internet’s Future, WASH. POST, June 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/11/AR2006061100707.html.
24. Morgan Stanley, The Mobile Internet Report Key Themes 405 (Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/techresearch/mobile_internet_report122009.html
[hereinafter Key Themes].
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a fair balance between net neutrality concerns and the need for effective
network management tools, leading to a realistic idea of net neutrality as the
market stands today. Part I of this note will outline a definition of net
neutrality and provide an introduction to the arguments both for and against
net neutrality. Part II provides an in-depth look at both past and present
federal regulation of broadband services. Part III discusses handset
exclusivity and the effects of the FCC’s decision to allow carriers to bundle
services with hardware, along with the effects that vertical and horizontal
integration have on net neutrality. Part IV provides insight into tiered
pricing, the FTC’s ability to regulate deceptive practices, and tiered
pricing’s ability to properly manage stressed mobile broadband networks.
Finally, Part V examines why the elimination of handset exclusivity and the
implementation of tiered pricing strikes the best balance between net
neutrality and carriers’ needs for the customer.
I. NET NEUTRALITY
In 2005, the FCC released a statement on net neutrality, which set forth
four principles to maintain an open internet.25 In its report, the FCC stated:
[T]o ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open,
affordable, and accessible to all consumers, the Commission adopts the
following principles:


. . . consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of
their choice.



. . . consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.



. . . consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices
that do not harm the network.



. . . consumers are entitled to competition among network
providers, application and service providers, and content
providers.26

Consequently, this line of thinking is in direct opposition with that of
handset exclusivity.
Opponents of net neutrality argue that tiered pricing would increase
broadband infrastructure.27 An experiment conducted in England

25. See FCC, 05-151 POLICY STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY 3 (2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-151A1.pdf
[hereinafter
POLICY
STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY].
26. Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
27. SARA PHILPOTT, IBM, EVOLVING MOBILE BROADBAND BUSINESS MODELS 7 (Mar.
2011), available at http://ibmtelconewsletter.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/broadband-paper
-march-2011.pdf.
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highlighted the need for more robust broadband networks.28 Three hundred
gigabytes of data were divided and loaded onto USB drives that were then
attached to a group of carrier pigeons.29 The pigeons were then directed to a
site 120 miles away.30 At the same time, the 300-gigabyte video file carried
by the birds was sent to the same location via the internet.31 The results
were noteworthy. “One hour and fifteen minutes later, all ten carrier
pigeons had successfully delivered their USB drives. Only 25% of the video
had . . . been successfully downloaded.”32 This experiment illustrates the
need for the expansion of broadband network infrastructure. Consequently,
net neutrality opponents contend that allowing service providers to alter
their pricing structures would incentivize the construction of more robust
networks.33 Additionally, opponents of net neutrality argue that the
broadband market is competitive enough, making governmental regulation
unnecessary.34 As Professor David Gelernter explains, “Maybe a company
should be allowed to do what it likes on its own . . . . If Verizon users don’t
like Verizon’s service, they’ll switch to a different I.S.P. [That] is called
‘competition.’”35 Although both proponents and opponents of net neutrality
have drawn clear battle lines, both sides can agree that the issue
surrounding mobile broadband will ultimately be decided by the federal
government, either through administrative or congressional action.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BROADBAND SERVICE
Under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, common carriers
are subject to strict regulations by the FCC.36 In 2002, however, the FCC
issued a declaratory ruling finding that “cable modem service is a single,
integrated service that enables the subscriber to utilize Internet access
service through a cable provider’s facilities.”37 Therefore, “[c]able modem
service is not itself and does not include an offering of telecommunications

28. Renee Oricchio, Where Carrier Pigeons Are Faster Than the Internet, INC. (Sept. 23,
2010), available at http://www.inc.com/tech-blog/where-carrier-pigeons-are-faster-than-theinternet.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+inc%2Fhe
adlines+%28Inc.com+Headlines%29.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See The Internet’s Future, supra note 23.
34. Robert A. Penchuk, Unleashing the Open Mobile Internet, 10 J. HIGH TECH L. 74, 83
(2009).
35. David Gelernter, Call It ‘Net Irrationality’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www
.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/08/09/who-gets-priority-on-the-web/call-it-net-irrationality-2.
36. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–212 (2006) (affording the FCC power
to regulate a common carrier’s service, charges, pricing policies, and corresponding violation
penalties).
37. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17
FCC Rcd. 4798, 4823 (Mar. 14, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking).
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service to subscribers.”38 Consequently, broadband cable modem service is
“properly classified as an interstate information service” and not as a
common carrier.39 The Supreme Court upheld this decision.40 As a result,
broadband cable modem service was no longer governed by Title II and,
consequently, was no longer subject to the same restrictions as common
carriers.41 Subsequently, in 2007, the FCC extended the moniker of
“information service” to cover mobile broadband service.42
Removal of Title II restrictions leaves broadband providers subject only
to the FCC’s Title I ancillary jurisdiction.43 The FCC has the power to
regulate ancillary jurisdiction under Title I under the following conditions:
“(1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations
are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its
statutorily mandated responsibilities.”44 Ancillary regulatory power under
Title I is significantly weaker than the FCC’s direct regulatory power under
Title II because no precise definition of “reasonably ancillary” is provided.
A pro-net neutrality organization, Public Knowledge, explains, “The
problem is that every time the FCC trie[s] to act in the broadband space, it
would essentially be rolling the dice. Whenever the FCC trie[s] to protect
consumers it would have to wait to see if a court agreed with its claim of
authority before taking meaningful action.”45 This concern was illustrated in
Comcast Corp. v. FCC. In Comcast, subscribers of Comcast’s broadband
service discovered that Comcast had been blocking some file-sharing
websites.46 Comcast argued that the interference of service was simply
network management due to a limited amount of broadband capacity. The
FCC, acting pursuant to what it believed was its Title I ancillary
jurisdiction, ordered Comcast to disclose the details of its network
management policy and stated that it would issue an injunction against
Comcast should it not disclose its policy or continue to discriminate against
the file-sharing sites.47 Comcast appealed the order, and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the FCC’s Title I ancillary
jurisdiction did not apply to a broadband service provider’s network
management because “the Commission . . . failed to tie its assertion of
38. Id.
39. Id. at 4802.
40. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005)
(holding that cable broadband providers are exempt from mandatory common carrier regulation).
41. Id. at 1000.
42. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment, supra note 10, at 5901.
43. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976.
44. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
45. Public Knowledge Explains: The Comcast-Bittorrent Decision, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Apr.
6, 2010, 3:48 PM) (on file with author).
46. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644.
47. Id.
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ancillary authority over Comcast’s Internet service to any ‘statutorily
mandated responsibility.’”48 Because the FCC classified wireless broadband
as an information service, this decision severely inhibited the FCC’s ability
to regulate wireless broadband and opened the door to allow wireless
broadband providers to regulate their networks as they see fit, without
regulatory oversight. Thus, in response to the Comcast decision, the FCC
has hinted that it may seek to reclassify broadband service as a
telecommunication service. Doing so would bring broadband service back
within the fold of Title II regulation.49
In the meantime, however, the FTC has shown renewed interest in net
neutrality.50 Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act (the FTC Act),
the FTC has the authority “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations
. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”51 Under the
FTC Act, the FTC does not have the power to regulate common carriers;
however, since broadband services are not classified as common carriers,
they are subject to FTC regulation.52 Consequently, the FTC has
investigated broadband providers regarding internet access,53 access to and
pricing of content, and deceptive marketing and billing practices.54 The
FTC describes its jurisdiction over broadband as follows:
[First,] the FTC has both authority and experience in the enforcement of
competition and consumer protection law provisions pertinent to
broadband Internet access. Second, the FTC Act provisions regarding
“[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” are general and
flexible in nature, as demonstrated by judicial and administrative decisions
across diverse markets. Third, the FTC’s investigative and enforcement
actions have been party- and market-specific; that is, neither the general
body of antitrust and consumer protection law nor the FTC’s enforcement
and policy record determines any particular broadband connectivity policy
or commits the Commission to favoring any particular model of
55
broadband deployment.

48. Id. at 661 (citation omitted).
49. Austin Schlick, General Counsel, FCC, Statement Outlining the FCC’s New Approach to
Internet Oversight (May 6, 2010), available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-20004324
-93.html?tag=mncol;txt.
50. Aruna Viswanatha, Could the FTC Regulate Net Neutrality?, MAIN JUSTICE (Apr. 12,
2010, 5:45 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/12/could-the-ftc-regulate-net-neutrality/.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
52. BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 38.
53. See Complaint, In re Am. Online, Inc. & Time Warner Inc., No. C-3989 (FTC. Dec. 14,
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aolcomplaint.pdf.
54. BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 39.
55. Id. at 41 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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As a result, “the FTC could require a broadband provider to disclose
how it manages its network and what speeds it offers.”56 Nonetheless, some
are skeptical of the FTC’s ability to actually prosecute such a case. “[T]he
kinds of practices that often come up under the guise of net neutrality would
rarely be a violation of the antitrust laws. . . . [I]n order to achieve the broad
objectives of people advocating net neutrality, you have to have
congressional action or reclassification.”57
On December 21, 2010, the FCC passed new net neutrality
regulations.58 The new rules “create two classes of Internet access, one for
fixed-line providers and the other for the wireless Net.”59 As a result,
landline providers are prevented from blocking or unreasonably
discriminating against content; however, due to heavy lobbying by Google
and Verizon, wireless internet providers are not completely restricted from
doing so.60 Therefore, in light of the Comcast decision and the questions
surrounding the FTC’s ability to effectively regulate broadband, absent
congressional intervention, it is unclear how the federal government could
properly address wireless net neutrality concerns. Therefore, the issues of
handset exclusivity and tiered pricing remain a significant concern in the
discussion of mobile broadband neutrality.
III. HANDSET EXCLUSIVITY
The FCC has stated that “consumers are entitled to connect their choice
of legal devices that do not harm the network.”61 When cell phones first
entered the market, exclusivity deals between handset manufactures and
wireless carriers were unheard of. Since 2004, however, almost every
popular phone to enter the market has been subject to exclusivity.62 Initially,
the Razr V3, Sidekick, iPhone, Blackberry Pearl, and Blackberry Curve
were only compatible with a single wireless carrier.63
There are essentially two ways in which carriers in the United States
achieve handset exclusivity.64 First, Code Division Multiple Access

56. Viswanatha, supra note 50.
57. Id. (quoting Donald Russell).
58. Net Neutrality, NYTIMES.COM (Dec. 22, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference
/timestopics/subjects/n/net_neutrality/index.html.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. POLICY STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY, supra note 25, at 3 (footnote omitted).
62. Hahn & Singer, supra note 1, at 318.
63. Id. at 319; Parul Sharma, Motorola DRIOD X in July and Motorola DROID 2 in
August…Get Ready to Grab, ABH NEWS (June 13, 2010), http://abh-news.com/motorola-driod-x
-in-july-and-motorola-droid-2-in-august-get-ready-to-grab-3245.html.
64. Tim Wu, Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone and Consumer Choice in Mobile
Broadband 8 (New Am. Found., Working Paper No. 17, 2007), available at http://www
.newamerica.net/publications/policy/wireless_net_neutrality.
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(CDMA) carriers,65 like Verizon,66 designate phones with an ID number,
which allows the phone to access the network.67 “Without an approved ID
number, telephones not sold by Verizon will not be recognized and cannot
be used on the network. This effectively makes Verizon Wireless the
gatekeeper of market entry for telephones on their network . . . .”68 Second,
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) carriers,69 like AT&T,70
make use of phones with SIM cards.71 The SIM card was designed to make
switching from one network to another as simple as removing the phone’s
original SIM card and replacing it with a new one.72 Yet, “[t]he mobile
device itself . . . can be designed to recognize and reject certain types of
SIM cards based on information carried on the SIM, creating a ‘lock.’”73
Thus, a customer who purchases a handset subject to exclusivity cannot
access any other network aside from his or her carrier’s network.
Accordingly, if an AT&T customer—who owns a phone subject to
exclusivity with AT&T—wants to switch to Verizon, that customer is
forced to purchase a new handset compatible with the Verizon network.74

65. “CDMA stands for Code Division Multiple Access. It is a technique used for digital
communication, and wireless technology in particular, that involves multiplexing. Whereas
conventional communication systems use constant frequencies, CDMA uses multiple access, or
multiplexing.” S. Roberts, What is CDMA?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is
-cdma.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
66. R. Kayne, What is the Difference Between GSM and CDMA?, WISEGEEK, http://www
.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-difference-between-gsm-and-cdma.htm (last modified Feb. 23, 2012).
67. Wu, supra note 64, at 8.
68. Id.
69. Ken Black, What is GSM?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-gsm.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2012).
GSM, or Global System for Mobile Communications, is a cellular phone protocol that
is popular in many parts of the world . . . .
....
One of the distinctive features of the GSM system is the use of SIM cards. This card
will store all personal data and contacts on it. Once a phone is traded for a new one,
transferring the data and activating the phone becomes simply a matter of changing the
card.
Id.

70. Our Mobile Broadband and GSM Technology, AT&T, http://www.wireless.att.com
/learn/why/technology/mobile-broadband-and-GSM.jsp (last visited Dec. 22, 2010).
71. Black, supra note 69.
72. Wu, supra note 64, at 9.
73. Id.
74. Interestingly, beginning April 8, 2012, AT&T
will offer qualifying customers the ability to unlock their AT&T iPhones. The only
requirements are that a customer’s account must be in good standing, their device
cannot be associated with a current and active term commitment on an AT&T customer
account, and they need to have fulfilled their contract term, upgraded under one of our
upgrade policies or paid an early termination fee.
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This concept is directly at odds with the idea that consumers should be free
to access content using equipment of their choosing.75
In response to handset exclusivity and concerns about the relationship
between handset manufacturers and carriers, Skype, an internet company,
formally requested that the FCC apply the principles set forth in the
Commission’s Carterfone decision to the wireless industry.76 Skype’s
concern was that “[i]n an effort to prefer their own affiliated services and
exclude rivals, carriers have disabled or crippled consumer-friendly features
of mobile devices.”77 Skype argued that applying Carterfone “[would]
ensure both that consumers retain a right to run the applications of their
choosing and [the] right to attach all non-harmful devices to the wireless
network.”78
In Carterfone, AT&T penalized customers for attaching a device,
known as the Carterfone, to their network.79 The penalty was based on an
FCC rule which stated that “no equipment, apparatus, circuit or device not
furnished by the telephone company shall be attached to or connected with
the facilities furnished by the telephone company, whether physically, by
induction or otherwise.”80 The FCC found that the Carterfone had no
adverse effect on the network and that AT&T’s continued prohibition on
third-party equipment “would be unreasonable and unduly
discriminatory.”81 As a result, “the provisions prohibiting the use of
customer-provided interconnecting devices should accordingly be
stricken.”82 Initially, like wireline telecommunication services, the FCC
required mobile equipment to be available for purchase unbundled from
wireless service.83 In 1992, the FCC repealed that decision in the Cellular
CPE Bundling Order.84 As a result, Skype requested that the FCC apply the
standard in Carterfone to wireless carriers. Central to its decision to allow

Andrew Munchbach, AT&T to Begin Unlocking Off-Contract iPhones This Sunday, April 8th,
ENDGAGET (Apr. 6, 2012, 1:23 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2012/04/06/atandt-to-begin
-unlocking-iphone-sunday-april-8/. iPhones still under contract will continue to be subject to
exclusivity. Id.
75. Internet Freedom and Innovation at Risk, supra note 14.
76. Petition to Confirm a Consumer’s Right to Use Internet Commc’ns Software & Attach
Devices to Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5042 (2007) (order).
77. Petition to Confirm a Consumer’s Right to Use Internet Commc’ns Software and Attach
Devices to Wireless Networks 2, In re Skype Commc’ns S.A.R.L. (RM–11361), (FCC Feb. 20,
2007), available at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Skype_Wireless_Device_Petition_2-20-07.pdf.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Use of the Carterfone Device, supra note 8, at 421.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 424.
82. Id.
83. Everett M. Ehrlich, Jeffrey A. Eisenach &Wayne A. Leighton, The Impact of Regulation
on Innovation and Choice in Wireless Communication, 9, 1 REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS,
23 (2009), available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne.2010.9.1/rne.2010.9.1.1194/rne.2010
.9.1.1194.xml.
84. Id. at 25.
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handset and service bundling was the existence of sufficient competition
within the wireless service market and the finding that “carriers did not
possess market power in the upstream market for handsets.”85 The FCC
stated that “modifying the bundling policy is in the public interest because
the public interest benefits of bundling in the cellular market outweigh the
potential for competitive harm.”86 In coming to this decision, the FCC
highlighted that “the records supports [sic] the conclusion that clarifying the
current bundling policy to allow facilities-based carriers to bundle cellular
CPE and service would not have an adverse impact on the cellular CPE
market.”87 Proponents of applying the Carterfone standard to wireless
carriers argue that “[y]ou just can’t sell in [the wireless] market like you do
in others. The carriers have ultimate control over what products reach the
market. If they don’t like what you’re doing, that’s too bad.”88
Since the FCC’s decision to allow bundling was so closely tied to
competition within the market, some believe that in order for the FCC’s
position to change regarding handset exclusivity, the FCC would need to be
presented with evidence of consumer harm due to a lack of competition.89
This theory is evidenced by an FCC decision involving the Public Utilities
Commission of Hawaii.90 In the petition, Hawaii asked the FCC for
permission “to retain state regulatory authority over the rates for intrastate
commercial mobile radio services.”91 In response, the FCC stated “that a
petition must be based on demonstrable evidence of anticompetitive
activity, or unjust and unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory,
rates.”92 According to the FCC, “specific allegations of fact” are required to
establish “anticompetitive or discriminatory practices or behavior by
commercial mobile radio service providers.”93 Implementation of the
Carterfone principles on the wireless broadband market would clearly be a
decision made by the FCC and not by an individual state, but the FCC’s
position in Petition on Behalf of the State of Hawaii shows a strong
aversion to creating new regulation in the mobile communications market
without clear evidence of anticompetitive behavior.
In terms of handset exclusivity, the anticompetitive behavior the FCC
covets in order to impose regulation may be found in two places. The first is

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 24.
CPE Bundling Order, supra note 8, at 2 (citation omitted).
Id. at 9.
Wu, supra note 64, at 7 (quoting anonymous source).
Saul Hansell, F.C.C. Weighs Need for New Cellphone Handset Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2009, at B.2.
90. See Petition on Behalf of the State of Hawaii, Public Utility Commission, for Authority to
Extend Its Rate Regulation of Commercial Mobile Radio Services in the State of Hawaii, 10 FCC
Rcd. 7872 (1995) (report and order).
91. Id. at 7872.
92. Id. at 7876.
93. Id.
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in the context of rural wireless carriers,94 and the second is in relation to
vertical and horizontal integration. Phones subject to exclusivity cannot
access networks other than the network their contract provides. As a result,
rural, small, and even midsize carriers are unable to provide the same
phones to their customers as those provided by major carriers. As the Rural
Cellular Association points out, “If the nation’s small and mid-size wireless
carriers are unable to get access to handsets that consumers have an interest
in purchasing, the ability of these carriers to effectively compete with the
nation’s largest carriers is significantly harmed.”95 Additionally, “customers
served by smaller carriers and new entrants are prevented from accessing
the most popular handsets and benefiting from the advances in wireless
handset technology until years after their urban counterparts.”96 In
conjunction with the Rural Cellular Association, the Public Interest
Spectrum Coalition states, “Without handset exclusivity arrangements, the
consumer could choose service provider and device independently. Instead,
rural and small wireless carriers face substantial obstacles to gaining new
customers by being unable to offer their customers desirable smartphones . .
. .”97
Although the FCC did not see any harm to consumers by allowing
bundling, it is hard to imagine that the FCC could have envisioned harm to
consumers, in the form of net neutrality concerns in regards to mobile
communication, when the CPE decision was made in 1992. Professor
Robert Frieden, an opponent of handset exclusivity, explains that “[w]e take
for granted the right to own and attach telephones to the wired network.
That freedom should extend to wireless networks . . . .”98 Proponents,
however, contend that exclusivity fosters innovation in part because both
the handset provider and carrier shoulder the risk of launching the new
product.99 This is done partly by the wireless carrier subsidizing the cost of

94. See Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Exclusivity Arrangements Between Commercial
Wireless Carriers and Handset Manufacturers (2009) (RM No. 11497) (comments of RTG,
OPASTCO, and NTCA), available at http://www.ntca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=2599:020209-joint-comments-re-exclusivity-arrangements-rm-11497&catid=379
:2009-federal-filings-&Itemid=1161.
95. Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Exclusivity Arrangements Between Commercial
Wireless Carriers and Handset Manufacturers at 19, In re Rural Cellular Ass’n (FCC Feb. 2, 2009)
(RM No. 11497) (summary of reply comments), available at http://www.rca-usa.org/associations
/6491/files/exclusive-handset-reply-comment-summary.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Exclusivity Arrangements Between Commercial
Wireless Carriers and Handset Manufacturers 3, In re Rural Cellular Ass’n (FCC Feb. 2, 2009)
(RM–11497) (comments of the Ad Hoc Public Interest Spectrum Coalition), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1973#ftr14.
98. Nancy Gohring, Senators Challenge AT&T’s Exclusive iPhone Deal, MACWORLD (June
18, 2009, 3:27 PM), http://www.macworld.com/article/141238/2009/06/iphone_congress.html
(quoting Robert Frieden).
99. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 1, at 340.
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the new phone, thereby making the retail price accessible to customers.100
Although handset exclusivity may promote innovation, this overlooks the
net neutrality concerns of content discrimination and the financial
impracticability of switching from one carrier to another created by these
exclusive deals. This, in turn, harms the consumer.
In the context of the net neutrality debate, handset exclusivity, as it
relates to vertical and horizontal integration, is of great concern. Vertical
integration is defined as “the merging together of two businesses that are at
different stages of production.”101 A clear example of vertical integration
can be seen in the merger between NBC Universal and Comcast.102
Comcast is a distributor of content through its cable and internet services.103
Through the merger, Comcast gained control of NBC Universal, a producer
of content through its ownership of local NBC stations, MSNBC, and
Bravo.104 Therefore, Comcast is now not only a distributor of content, but
also a major producer of content. As a result, the concern is that Comcast
will discriminate against other content producers, limiting what is available
to the consumer.105 In a 2007 staff report on broadband competition, the
FTC found that “[i]n particular, proponents [of net neutrality] are concerned
that providers may block or discriminate against unaffiliated content and
applications, to the benefit of affiliated offerings.”106 This scenario could
manifest itself when a broadband provider with significant market power in
a given market has an interest in content or applications, creating an
incentive to block or degrade competing content or applications.107 In 2005,
the internet phone company Vonage filed a complaint with the FCC, stating
that Madison River Communications, a phone and internet provider, was
intentionally blocking internet users from accessing Vonage over the
Madison River network.108 “For Madison River Communications, the
interest in protecting current voice-based revenues made the case for
100. Id.
101. Vertical Integration, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node
/13396061.
102. Brian Stelter & Tim Arango, Comcast Receives Approval for NBC Universal Merger, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at B.9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/business/media
/19comcast.html.
103. Cecilia Kang, Franken Presses Holder On Comcast-NBC Merger, POST TECH WASH.
POST (Apr. 15, 2010, 10:14 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/04/senator
_franken_presses_us_ag.html.
104. Cecilia Kang, Planned Comcast-NBC Merger Ignites TV Access Battle, POST BUS. WASH.
POST (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/03
/AR2009120300947.html.
105. Brian Stelter, Democrats Question Comcast on NBC Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at
B.2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/business/media/05comcast.html.
106. BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 70.
107. Id.
108. See Declan McCullagh, Telco Agrees to Stop Blocking VoIP Calls, CNET (Mar. 3, 2005,
1:08 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Telco-agrees-to-stop-blocking-VoIP-calls/2100-7352_3-5598633
.html?part=rss&tag=5598371&subj=news.
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blocking [voice-over-internet protocol] services quite compelling.”109
Ultimately, Madison River settled the matter by agreeing to remove the
blockade and pay $15,000 pursuant to a consent decree.110
The Madison River scenario is a significant concern in the wireless
market. As of March 23, 2011, four wireless carriers showed a commanding
grip on the wireless market in the United States.111 Verizon possessed a
31.3 percent market share, AT&T a 26.6 percent share, Sprint a 16.1
percent share, and T-Mobile rounded out the big four with a 12.2 percent
share.112 With such a high level of market penetration, there is a significant
incentive for any one of these carriers to show preferential treatment to
affiliated content and discriminate against nonaffiliated or competitive
content and services. This point was illustrated when it was reported that
“Apple has declined to approve the Google Voice application for the iPhone
and has removed related (and previously approved) third-party applications
from the Apple App Store.”113 AT&T implied it was not involved, and
Apple declined to comment.114 It is easy, however, to see the correlation
between the Madison River case and the Google Voice matter. Like
Vonage, Google Voice offers services via the internet that AT&T offers via
its wireless network, including text messaging and voice services.115 In a
similar case, Skype, another application that allows users to make phone
calls via the internet, was initially approved only for use on the iPhone
while the phone was connected to the internet through a Wi-Fi
connection.116 This restriction prevented Skype users from using their
phone as a substitute for AT&T’s wireless phone service. There is no
question that restrictions like these in the mobile broadband market reduce
the open internet and are contrary to the principle that “consumers are

109. Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 285
(2008).
110. Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297 (2005).
111. See David Goldman, Time for Verizon to Buy Sprint?, CNNMONEY (Mar. 23, 2011, 6:21
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/23/technology/sprint_verizon/index.htm.
112. Id.
113. Letter from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief, Wireless Telecomms. Bureau, FCC, to
Catherine A. Novelli, Vice President, Worldwide Gov’t Affairs, Apple, Inc. (July 31, 2009),
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/wsj-2009-0731-FCCApple.pdf
(footnote omitted).
114. Jason Kincaid, FCC Takes On Apple and AT&T over Google Voice Rejection,
TECHCRUNCH (July 31, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/07/31/fcc-takes-on-apple-and-att-overgoogle-voice-rejection/.
115. See Kevin Purdy, Google Voice Is Cool, But Do You Need It?, LIFEHACKER (July 1, 2009,
5:00 PM), http://lifehacker.com/5304800/google-voice-is-cool-but-do-you-need-it. Since this
issue arose, Google Voice has become available in the Apple App store. ITUNES.APPLE.COM,
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/google-voice/id318698524?mt=8 (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
116. Skype Launches iPhone App, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (Mar. 31, 2009, 5:04 PM),
http://blogs.consumerreports.org/electronics/2009/03/skype-launches-iphone-app.html.
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entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the
needs of law enforcement.”117
In contrast to vertical integration, horizontal integration is defined as
the “acquisition of additional business activities that are at the same level of
the value chain in similar . . . industries.”118 Once again, the Comcast/NBC
Universal merger provides a clear example. As Dr. Mark Cooper explained
in testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee,
NBC content is available online in a variety of forms and on different
websites and services. Most prominently, of course, NBC is a stakeholder
in Hulu – an online video distribution portal that draws millions of
viewers. Comcast has put resources into developing its own online video
site – “Fancast”– where consumers can find content owned by the cable
operator. The merger eliminates this nascent, head-to-head competition.119

The fear is that horizontal integration destroys competitive practices.120
Professor John Blevins points out that “[s]ince 2000, the [wireless] industry
has rapidly consolidated in a wave of mergers of all sizes.”121 He goes on to
highlight the fact that “[t]hese mergers have created a much different world
than existed at the beginning of the decade . . . . [T]he top four carriers now
command roughly 87% of subscribers (compared to less than half a decade
earlier).”122 The fear expressed concerning the destruction of competitive
practices regarding the Comcast/NBC Universal merger is the same
regarding the rapid consolidation of the wireless industry.123 In letters to the
FCC and the Department of Justice in 2009, Senator Herb Kohl stated, “I
am concerned that the concentrated nature of the cell phone marketplace
could lead to future price increases for this and other cell phone services
relied upon by millions of Americans.”124 This fear became even more
prevalent when the now defunct AT&T/T-Mobile merger was proposed last

117. POLICY STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY, supra note 25, at 3.
118. Horizontal
Integration,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h
/horizontalintegration.asp#axzz1rNg9Ri4L (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
119. Mark Cooper, Dir. of Research, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Testimony before the Commerce
Comm., U.S. Senate: Consumers, Competition and Consolidation in the Video Broadband Market
5 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id
=e6645c9b-71a8-4b9a-9552-dd0dafd0ba46.
120. See id.
121. John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broadband
Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 92 (2009). “These mergers include: NextWave/Cingular
(2004); Cingular/AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (AT&T) (2004); Alltel/Western Wireless Corp.
(2005); Nextel/Sprint (2005); AT&T/BellSouth Corp. (2007); AT&T/Dobson (2007); TMobile/SunCom Wireless (2008); AT&T/Aloha Partners (2008); Verizon Wireless/Rural Cellular
(2008); Verizon/Alltel (2008); AT&T/Centennial (2009) (announced).” Id.
122. Id. (footnote omitted).
123. See Cecilia Kang, Key Senator Backs Telecom Probe, WASH. POST, July 7, 2009, at A.12,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070603
526.html.
124. Id. (quoting Senator Herb Kohl).
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year.125 Horizontal integration has a direct effect on wireless broadband
neutrality because as the wireless market becomes more consolidated, there
is less consumer choice regarding service and a reduced incentive on the
part of the carriers to offer data plans at competitive prices. If competition is
eliminated, prices can be set at whatever level the carrier chooses. This
issue is further compounded by handset exclusivity because fewer choices
within the wireless market are available due to a customer’s inability to
connect their device to any of the other remaining networks. Therefore, if
competition is reduced due to horizontal integration within the wireless
market and a carrier decides to set data plans at monopoly prices, a
customer subject to handset exclusivity would be trapped into either paying
the higher price for a data plan or spending additional money to purchase a
new handset with a different carrier.
During the AOL/Time Warner merger, the FTC acted on this concern
of anticompetitive pricing in the wireline broadband market.126 Fearing that
the merger would reduce AOL’s incentive to offer broadband internet at a
competitive price to cable, the FTC issued an order requiring “the company,
in areas where it provided cable broadband service, to offer AOL’s DSL
service in the same manner and at the same retail pricing as in areas where
it did not provide cable broadband service.”127 Clearly, there is regulatory
concern over horizontal mergers similar to those seen in the wireless
industry in the past decade and “[t]he FTC maintains any term that is ‘likely
to affect [consumers’] choice of, or conduct regarding a product’ is material
and enforceable.”128 As we have seen, there is at least some evidence that
horizontal integration, coupled with handset exclusivity, significantly
affects a consumer’s choice of product—an affect which is at odds with the
FCC’s statement that “consumers are entitled to competition among
network providers . . . .”129
For critics of net neutrality, it is easy to argue that if wireless customers
do not approve of the actions of their current carrier, they can simply switch
to a different one. Yet, for a customer who has purchased an internetcapable smartphone subject to a contract of exclusivity (making his or her
phone inoperable on a different wireless network), simply switching to a
different carrier is financially impracticable since it would require
purchasing a new smartphone that is compatible with the new network. This
125. Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, DEALB%K N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid
-for-t-mobile/.
126. Cody Vitello, Network Neutrality Generates a Contentious Debate Among Experts: Should
Consumers Be Worried?, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 513, 535 (2010).
127. BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 39 (footnote
omitted).
128. Vitello, supra note 126, at 536 (quoting Federal Trade Comm’n, Staff Report, Broadband
Connectivity Competition Policy, 135 (2007)) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
129. POLICY STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY, supra note 25, at 3.
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sentiment was echoed in a report issued by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), which stated that “consumer groups . . . perceive . . .
exclusive handset arrangements as creating . . . anticompetitive switching
costs.”130 Because of this, if a wireless carrier decides to exhibit preferential
treatment to certain content carried via its data network, the customers
could feel as though their only choices are to either remain with their
current carrier, subject to the content discrimination, or be forced to
purchase a new handset with a different carrier. Similarly, with regards to
switching to AT&T for the iPhone, one commentator stated that with the
extra cost of buying the iPhone itself, “it may make more financial sense to
stay put with your existing carrier and buy a comparable device instead.”131
This scenario is at odds with the notion of maintaining an open internet.
Wireline broadband providers argue that prioritizing content is essential
to network management due to the high demand for limited bandwidth.132
The issue of network congestion, however, is not limited to standard
wireline broadband. Network congestion exists in the wireless world as
well.133 According to a 2009 study, when wireless networks reach 75
percent utilization, the networks encounter problems with just a slight
increase in data traffic during high-usage periods.134 The study goes on to
point out that, at the time the data was collected, network utilization in
major markets was between 80–90 percent, well over the 75 percent
warning level.135 Additionally, it has been estimated that “[g]lobal mobile
IP traffic [is] likely to grow [sixty-six times] by 2013,”136 and rising
“smartphone penetration [and] emerging usage models (such as video/audio
streaming) will stress carrier wireless networks.”137 In line with these
predictions, Verizon has stated that it predicts 70–80 percent of its
customers will eventually utilize smartphones for their wireless needs.138

130. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-779, ENHANCED DATA
COLLECTION COULD HELP FCC BETTER MONITOR COMPETITION IN THE WIRELESS INDUSTRY,
26 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/locate?searched=1&o=0&order_by=date
&search_type=publications&keyword=wireless&Submit=Search [hereinafter ENHANCED DATA
COLLECTION].
131. Lisa Scherzer, Switching Carriers to Get the iPhone Can Cost You, SMARTMONEY (July 3,
2008), http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/deals/switching-carriers-to-get-the-iphone-can-cost
-you-23405/#ixzz13sg64F38.
132. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13055 (2008) (memorandum
opinion and order).
133. See MORGAN STANLEY, THE MOBILE INTERNET REPORT SETUP 62 (Dec. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/techresearch/mobile_internet_report
122009.html [hereinafter MOBILE INTERNET REPORT SETUP].
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Key Themes, supra note 24, at 400.
137. Id.
138. Lance Whitney, Verizon Wireless Eyeing Tiered Data Service, CNET (June 18, 2010, 7:10
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-20008138-94.html.
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This congestion has led wireless providers to begin implementing tieredpricing models for data plans.139 Although consumers fear the change to
tiered-pricing plans,140 this structure is in the best interest of both mobile
broadband neutrality and the consumer.
IV. TIERED PRICING
Due to considerable network congestion throughout wireless networks,
a transition from the standard “unlimited” data plans to a tiered-pricing
structure will help manage already stressed networks141 and provide
financial incentives for carriers to make networks more robust.142
During the infancy of the mobile communications market, individual
states had the power to regulate mobile pricing.143 The federal government,
however, wrestled away police power over mobile communications pricing
in 1993 by amending the Communications Act of 1934 to read, “[N]o State
or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the
rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile
service . . . .”144 As a result, the power to regulate any new pricing plans lies
within the federal government’s purview.
The FCC has acknowledged that tiered pricing is a “permissible
network management technique.”145 Professor Babette Boliek points out,
“[T]he move to two-tiered pricing for broadband consumption by the
mobile industry would appear a natural development. The industry, by
extensive trial and evolution, established a multi-tiered pricing structure,
based primarily on usage for its core voice transmission business.”146 This
change may not only be a natural transition, it might be a necessary one.
The chairman of the FCC has predicted an ominous future, indicating “a
looming spectrum crisis” if more broadband space cannot be allocated for
mobile internet use.147

139. See Amy Thomson, Verizon Sees Wireless Moving to Tiered Pricing with 4G Network,
BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2010, 5:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/verizon
-sees-wireless-moving-to-tiered-pricing-with-4g-network.html.
140. See Sean Fallon, Outrage Prompts Time Warner to Drop Tiered Pricing Until We Can Be
Educated, GIZMODO (Apr. 16, 2009, 4:34 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5215266/outrage-prompts
-time-warner-to-drop-tiered-pricing-until-we-can-be-educated.
141. Key Themes, supra note 24, at 405.
142. Penchuk, supra note 34, at 76.
143. Babette E.L. Boliek, Wireless Net Neutrality Regulation and the Problem with Pricing: An
Empirical, Cautionary Tale, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2009).
144. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2006) amended by Pub. L. No
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
145. Christopher Fedeli, Carpool Lanes on the Internet: Effective Network Management, 26
COMM. LAW. 1, 29 (July 2009).
146. Boliek, supra note 143, at 20.
147. FCC Warns of Mobile’s Looming Spectrum Crisis, MSNBC (Oct. 7, 2009, 7:49 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33216878/ns/technology_and_science-wireless/ (quoting the FCC
Chairman Julius Genachowsk).
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AT&T and Verizon have already implemented a consumption-based
tiered-pricing scheme for its data plans.148 Sprint is currently the only major
carrier still offering an unlimited data plan.149 A shift in pricing structure is
beneficial for three reasons: First, a tiered-pricing structure allows
customers to choose a tier based on their actual usage without subsidizing
high volume users.150 Professor Boliek explains, “Under differential pricing,
the grandmother who sends occasional e-mails will pay less for Internet
access than the individual who downloads 1,500 HD movies in one month.
Price is the most common means by which scarce resources may be most
efficiently allocated.”151 Second, allowing providers to offer a consumerbased tiered-pricing system is content neutral.152 Unlike tiered-pricing
structures in which content producers pay broadband providers for
prioritized delivery of their content, consumer-based tiered pricing does not
favor any type of content over another.153 Third, tiered pricing creates
greater transparency between the provider and consumer. Under the
common “unlimited” data plans, the term “unlimited” never really held true
to the definition of the word.154
Professor Catherine Sandoval writes that in light of the FTC’s standard
for deceptive practices, advertisements for “unlimited” data plans with
restrictions buried in the seemingly never-ending fine print “would not meet
the FTC Act’s standard.”155 The FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.”156 “To prove a deceptive act or
practice under § 5(a)(1), the FTC must show three elements: (1) a
representation, omission, or practice, that (2) is likely to mislead consumers
acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) [that] the representation,
omission, or practice is material.”157 “The law is violated if the first contact
. . . is secured by deception . . . even though the true facts are made known
to the buyer before he enters into the contract of purchase.”158 Tiered
148. Jenna Worthan, As Networks Speed Up, Data Hits a Wall, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, at
B.1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/technology/as-mobile-networks-speed-updata-gets-capped.html?pagewanted=all.
149. Id.
150. Boliek, supra note 143, at 19.
151. Id. (footnote omitted).
152. Boliek, supra note 143, at 19–20 n.85.
153. Larry Greenemeier, FCC Ends Net Neutrality Debate (for Now) by Passing Its Open
Internet Order, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com
/article.cfm?id=fcc-ends-net-neutrality-debate.
154. Catherine J. K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of
the Federal Trade Commission Act’s Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality
Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 669 (2009).
155. Id.
156. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
157. FTC v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting
FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006)).
158. Id. at 304 (quoting Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1961))
(alteration in original).
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pricing would not eliminate all claims of this nature; however, the proposed
Broadband Internet Fairness Act sets forth viable safeguards against unfair
tiered-pricing plans.159 Professor Boliek points out, “[T]here is no carve out
for mobile operators and . . . this would likely cover a great many
participants in the mobile industry who offer even limited Internet
access.”160 The Broadband Internet Fairness Act states, “It shall be unlawful
for major broadband Internet service providers to offer volume usage
service plans imposing rates, terms, and conditions that are unjust,
unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory.”161 Under the Act, if a
broadband provider intends to implement tiered pricing, the provider is
required to file a plan analysis with the FTC that does the following:
(1) identifies the different service tiers of broadband Internet service to be
offered on the basis of different data transmission volumes;
(2) specifies the different rates, terms, and conditions to be imposed for
such tiers;
(3) provides an analysis of the economic reasonableness and necessity for
imposing such tiers.162

Under the Act, enforcement of tiered-pricing plans would be under the
FTC’s jurisdiction,163 and any violation would “be treated as a violation of a
rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section
18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”164 Safeguards such as
those proposed by the Broadband Internet Fairness Act would ensure that,
unlike the vague “unlimited” data plans, consumers would know, pursuant
to the act, exactly what the individual tiers offer and that they have been
deemed fair and reasonable. This would allow for a more informed and
transparent decision when choosing a data plan.
Unfortunately, tiered pricing coupled with handset exclusivity limits the
consumer’s options in the same way that handset exclusivity limits the
consumer’s options in the context of content discrimination and vertical and
horizontal integration discussed above. Because the customer is tied to the
carrier through handset exclusivity, the customer would be unable to shop
for the tiered-pricing plan for their specific needs without incurring the
additional cost of purchasing a compatible handset, assuming the consumer
chose to change carriers. One of the criticisms of tiered pricing is that the
possible overage charges associated with exceeding the allocated bandwidth
159. See generally Broadband Internet Fairness Act, H.R. 2902, 111th Cong. (2009), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2902.
160. Boliek, supra note 143, at 21 (footnote omitted).
161. Broadband Internet Fairness Act, H.R. 2902, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2902.
162. Id. § 3(b)(3).
163. Id. § 4(a).
164. Id. (citation omitted).
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per month may discourage some users from accessing the internet, reducing
the overall “openness” of the internet that net advocates of neutrality are
fighting to maintain.165 Handset exclusivity exacerbates these concerns.
Typically coupled with a handset, subject to exclusivity, is a contract with
the carrier that binds the consumer to a sizeable early termination fee.166
Verizon charges an early termination fee of up to $350,167 AT&T $325,168
and T-Mobile up to $200.169 In January 2010, AT&T settled a class action
lawsuit claiming that the early termination fees included in customer
contracts were unfairly high.170 Customers filed the suit claiming “the fees
were illegal because they bore no relation to the carrier’s actual costs, and
discouraged customers from switching carriers.”171 AT&T did not
acknowledge any wrongdoing, but agreed to pay $18 million to customers
to avoid litigation.172 Previously, Sprint settled similar claims to the tune of
$17.5 million.173 Due to the settlement, the court did not rule on the legality
of these early terminations.174 Still, customers acknowledged that the fees
discourage switching carriers, contributing to the problems associated with
handset exclusivity. Proponents fear that tiered pricing could restrict use of
the mobile internet. The cost of many new model smartphones, provided
that the consumer signs another contract subject to a similar termination
fee, can be as much as $399.175 As a result, a consumer who is locked into a
carrier through handset exclusivity, who does not find a pricing level that is
suitable to his or her needs, may have to pay $550 simply to change carriers
165. See Cecilia Kang, AT&T Tiered Data Plan and Questions About Regulatory Oversight,
POST TECH WASH. POST (June 4, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech
/2010/06/thanks_reader_bitter_bill_for.html.
166. See ENHANCED DATA COLLECTION, supra note 130, at 2.
167. Return Policy, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.verionwireless.com/ReturnPolicy.shtml
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
168. 1.2 What Happens If My Service is Cancelled or Terminated Before the End of My
Agreement? Is There a Cancellation/Early Termination Fee?, AT&T, http://www.wireless.att
.com/cellphoneservice/legal/index.jsp?q_termsKey=wirelessCustomerAgreement&q_termsName
=Wireless+Customer+Agreement&subSection=whatHappensIfMyServIsCancelled (last visited
Nov. 21, 2010).
169. T-Mobile Terms & Conditions, TMOBILE, http://www.tmobile.com/Templates/Popup.aspx
?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditions&print=true (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
170. Brian Barrett, AT&T Reaches $18 Million Settlement in New Jersey ETF Class Action
Case, GIZMODO (Jan. 26, 2010, 12:41 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5457345/att-reaches-18-million
-settlement-in-new-jersey-etf-class-action-case.
171. Peter Svensson, AT&T Settles Class Action over Termination Fees, MSNBC (Jan. 27,
2010,
12:31
PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35101538/ns/technology_and_science
-wireless/t/att-settles-class-action-over-termination-fees/#.TyRS5YEXLVo.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Apple iPhone 4s 64GB, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.verizonwireless.com
/b2c/store/controller?item=phoneFirst&action=viewPhoneDetail&selectedPhoneId=5777 (enter
zip code: 11201) (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (stating that a $350 early termination fee applies to
two-year contracts); PDAs & Smartphones, AT&T, http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone
-service/cell-phones/pda-phones-smartphones.jsp (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
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and find a favorable pricing structure. This scenario could force customers
to restrict internet usage as a result of having to settle for a plan that does
not adequately address their usage needs. Not only does this exasperate the
concerns of those who fear tiered pricing may restrict use of the mobile
internet, but it also adds to the limitations already discussed concerning
consumer choice. Eliminating the cost of purchasing a new handset from a
new carrier and permitting customers to use their existing handsets on their
new network creates greater freedom of mobility and allows customers
searching for suitable pricing plans to test the market instead of being
forced into a tier on their existing network.
Additionally, although consumers may initially have a negative reaction
to the implementation of tiered pricing,176 consumer-based tiered pricing is
in line with consumer interests. As one commenter noted, “Consumers are
used to paying about $30 or so for ‘unlimited’ data with a smartphone . . .
.”177 Yet, “[m]ost people don’t even come close to using enough mobile
data to justify spending $30 a month.”178 According to AT&T, almost half
of their network capacity is being used by a staggeringly low 3 percent of
its customers.179 As a result, as noted above, “the majority of users are
essentially subsidizing the costs of these heavy data users and that doesn’t
seem fair.”180 The system, as it stands now, is analogous to going out to
dinner with a group of people and ordering a salad while everyone else
orders the lobster dinner, and then at the end of the meal, splitting the cost
evenly with everyone else. No consumer wants to pay for someone else’s
service when there is no need to do so. Therefore, the tiered-pricing model
is advantageous to consumers.
V. STRIKING A BALANCE
Today, as more people access the internet via their mobile handsets,181
the network has become severely congested.182 Heavy network traffic
results in broadband providers expressing the need to prioritize content as a
form of network management in order to maintain service to their
customers. One way to combat network congestion, in a neutral manner, is
to institute tiered-pricing structures for data plans. Tiered pricing addresses
both the need to allocate bandwidth efficiently and discourage content
discrimination. In the context of the mobile broadband market, the concern
of content discrimination and an open internet can also be addressed with
176. See Fallon, supra note 140.
177. Marin Perez, Tiered Data Pricing Might Not Be That Bad, KNOW YOUR CELL (May 28,
2010),
http://www.knowyourcell.com/features/494834/tiered_data_pricing_might_not_be_that
_bad.html.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Mobile Internet Report Setup, supra note 133, at 12.
182. See id. at 62.
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the abolition of handset exclusivity. Allowing customers to attach a device
of their choosing to any mobile broadband network is essential to
combating the discrimination problems associated with vertical integration
and maintaining a neutral internet. Perhaps most importantly, instituting
tiered pricing and eliminating handset exclusivity adheres to the FCC’s four
principles of net neutrality.183 The elimination of handset exclusivity would
allow consumers to connect devices of their choice to any network, in effect
fostering competition,184 and disincentivizing content discrimination.185 The
application of tiered-pricing structures would allow necessary, contentneutral network management,186 greater customer choice regarding
service,187 and greater transparency between carrier and customer.188
CONCLUSION
In today’s world, instituting tiered pricing for mobile data plans, while
at the same time abolishing handset exclusivity, addresses both the concerns
of net neutrality advocates as well as the pressing needs of broadband
providers. Therefore, tiered pricing strikes the proper balance between
maintaining a neutral internet and providing effective services.
Ethan Zweig
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186.
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188.

See discussion supra Part I.
See discussion supra Part III.
See id.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See id.
See id.
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